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Abstract
The nonmonotonic logics definable by definability-preserving choice
functions that satisfy Coherence have been studied in [7]. Larger fam-
ilies correspond to weakenings of this property. The cumulative and
loop-cumulative relations of [6] are characterized by such models and,
as a consequence, one may study the natural connectives for those
logics. The representation results obtained are surprisingly smooth:
in the completeness part the choice function may be defined on any
set of models, not only definable sets and no definability-preservation
property is required in the soundness part. For those logics, proper
conjunction and negation may be defined, but no proper disjunction,
contrary to the situation studied in [7]. Quantum Logics, as defined
by [3] are such Logics but the orthogonal complement does not provide
a proper negation.
∗This work was partially supported by the Jean and Helene Alfassa fund for research
in Artificial Intelligence.
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1 Introduction
In [1], Birkhoff and von Neumann suggested that the logic of quantum me-
chanics be isomorphic to the algebra of closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces,
under “set product” (i.e., intersection), “closed linear sum”, and “orthogonal
complement”. Many researchers studied the properties of those operations
and their results are reviewed in [2]. Recently, Engesser and Gabbay [3] pro-
posed a very different and deeper connection between Logics and Quantum
mechanics. For them every quantum state defines a consequence relation.
They showed that those consequence relations are nonmonotonic and enjoy
some of the most important properties studied in [6], in particular cumula-
tivity. Whereas Engesser and Gabbay assume a language closed under the
propositional connectives (as did Birkhoff and von Neumann), even though
those connectives are not at all classical, the purpose of this paper is to study
and try to characterize the consequence operations presented by Quantum
mechanics before any connectives are defined, in the style of the author’s [7].
Since Quantum Logics fail, in general, to satisfy two of the properties as-
sumed there, representation results for larger families than those of [7] are
needed. Such results will be developed first. For the conservative extension
results to be proven below, models closer to the cumulative models of [6]
or of [8] could have been used. The models presented here and their tight
link with the failure of Coherence have been preferred both for their intrinsic
interest and for compatibility with [7].
1.1 Reflections on this paper
The study of C-logics is unexpectedly smooth and attractive. The basic
intuition behind the cumulative relations of KLM is confirmed: cumulative
relations yield classical connectives but the disjunction (that may be defined
as usual from negation and conjunction) does not behave proof-theoretically
as a proper disjunction should. The section on L-logics is less interesting. I
am not sure where it leads. The results are straightforward translation from
KLM and L-logics do not seem to behave in any better way with respect to
connectives than C-logics. The reason it may be interesting is that Quantum
Logics are not only C-logics but also L-logics. But two main questions are left
open: can all L-logics be presented as Quantum Logics or do Quantum Logics
satisfy additional properties? What is the meaning for Quantum Logics of
the classical negation and conjunction that can be defined for any C-logics?
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Why do Birkhoff and von Neumann expect that the negation of an observable
be observable?
2 C-logics
2.1 Definition
The framework is the one presented in [7]. Let L be any non-empty set. The
elements of L should be viewed as propositions or formulas and L is therefore
a language. At present no structure is assumed on L and its elements are
therefore to be taken as atomic propositions. Let C : 2L −→ 2L.
Definition 1 The operation C is said to be a C-logics iff it satisfies the two
following properties.
Inclusion ∀A ⊆ L , A ⊆ C(A),
Cumulativity ∀A,B ⊆ L, A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A)⇒ C(A) = C(B).
2.2 Properties
Lemma 1 (Makinson) An operation C is a C-logics iff it satisfies Inclu-
sion,
Idempotence ∀A ⊆ L, C(C(A)) = C(A)
and
Cautious Monotonicity ∀A,B ⊆ L A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A)⇒ C(A) ⊆ C(B)
Proof: Let us prove, first, that a C-logics satisfies Idempotence. By In-
clusion A ⊆ C(A) ⊆ C(A), therefore, by Cumulativity: C(A) = C(C(A)). As-
sume, now that C satisfies Inclusion, Idempotence and Cautious Monotonicity.
Let A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). By Cautious Monotonicity, we have C(A) ⊆ C(B). There-
fore, we have B ⊆ C(A) ⊆ C(B). By Cautious Monotonicity again, we have:
C(B) ⊆ C(C(A)). By Idempotence, then, we conclude C(B) ⊆ C(A) and
therefore C(B) = C(A).
Lemma 2 (Makinson) An operation C is a C-logics iff it satisfies Inclusion
and
2− Loop A ⊆ C(B), B ⊆ C(A)⇒ C(A) = C(B).
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Proof: Assume C is a C-logics and A ⊆ C(B). By Inclusion, we have
B ⊆ A ∪ B ⊆ C(B) and by Cumulativity: C(B) = C(A ∪B). Similarly B ⊆ C(A)
implies C(A) = C(A ∪B).
Assume now that C satisfies Inclusion and 2-Loop, and thatA ⊆ B ⊆ C(A).
By Inclusion: A ⊆ B ⊆ C(B). By 2-Loop, then, we have: C(A) = C(B).
The finer study of C-logics relies, as for monotonic logics, on the notions of
a consistent set and of a theory.
Definition 2 A set A ⊆ L is said to be consistent iff C(A) 6= L. A set A for
which C(A) = L is said to be inconsistent.
The following follows from Idempotence.
Lemma 3 A set A is consistent iff C(A) is.
Lemma 4 If A ⊆ B and A is inconsistent, so is B.
Proof: If C(A) = L, we have A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A) and, by Cumulativity, C(B) = C(A) = L.
Definition 3 A set A ⊆ L is said to be maximal consistent iff it is consistent
and any strict superset B ⊃ A is inconsistent.
Definition 4 A set T ⊆ L is said to be a theory iff C(T ) = T .
The following is obvious (by Inclusion).
Lemma 5 There is only one inconsistent theory, namely L.
Lemma 6 Any maximal consistent set A is a theory.
Proof: By Inclusion A ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 3 the set C(A) is consistent and
by maximality: A = C(A).
Notation:Let us define Cn : 2L −→ 2L by:
Cn(A) =
⋂
T⊇A, T a theory
T.
The following follows from Lemma 5.
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Lemma 7
Cn(A) =
⋂
T⊇A, T a consistent theory
T.
Lemma 8 A ⊆ Cn(A) ⊆ C(A).
Proof: By the definition of Cn and the fact that C(A) is a theory that
includes A (Idempotence and Inclusion).
Lemma 9 A set A ⊆ L is inconsistent iff Cn(A) = L.
Proof: If Cn(A) = L, then, by Lemma 8, C(A) = L. If A is inconsistent,
then, by Lemma 4, there is no consistent theory that includes A and, by
Lemma 7, Cn(A) = L.
Lemma 10 C(A) = Cn(C(A)) = C(Cn(A)).
Proof: By Lemma 8, we have C(A) ⊆ Cn(C(A)) ⊆ C(C(A)). By Idempo-
tence, then, the first equality is proved. By Lemma 8 and Cumulativity, we
have C(A) = C(Cn(A)).
Corollary 1 For any theory T , Cn(T ) = T .
Proof: Cn(T ) = Cn(C(T )) = C(T ) = T .
Lemma 11 The operation Cn is monotonic, i.e., if A ⊆ B, then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B)
and also idempotent, i.e., Cn(Cn(A)) = Cn(A).
Proof: Monotonicity follows immediately from the definition of Cn. For
Idempotence, notice that, by Monotonicity and Corollary 1, any theory T
that includes A also includes Cn(A): Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(T ) = T .
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2.3 fC-models
Assume M is a set (of models), about which no assumption is made, and
|=⊆M×L is a (satisfaction) binary relation (nothing assumed either). For
any set A ⊆ L, we shall denote by Â or by Mod(A) the set of all models that
satisfy all elements of A:
Â = Mod(A) = {x ∈M | x |= a, ∀a ∈ A}.
For typographical reasons we shall use both notations, sometimes even in the
same formula. For any set of models X ⊆M, we shall denote by X the set
of all formulas that are satisfied in all elements of X :
X = {a ∈ L | x |= a, ∀x ∈ X}.
The following are easily proven, for any A,B ⊆ L, X, Y ⊆M: they amount
to the fact that the operations X 7→ X and A 7→ Â form a Galois connection.
A ⊆ Â , X ⊆ X̂
̂A ∪B = Â ∩ B̂ , X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y
A ⊆ B ⇒ B̂ ⊆ Â , X ⊆ Y ⇒ Y ⊆ X
A ⊆ B ⇒ Â ⊆ B̂ , X ⊆ Y ⇒ X̂ ⊆ Ŷ
Â =
̂̂
A , X = X̂
The last technical notion that will be needed is that of a definable set of mod-
els. It will be used in the completeness proof below, but not in Definition 6.
Definition 5 A set X of models is said to be definable iff one of the two
following equivalent conditions holds:
1. ∃A ⊆ L such that X = Â, or
2. X = X̂.
The set of all definable subsets of X will be denoted by DX .
The proof of the equivalence of the two propositions above is obvious.
Lemma 12 If X and Y are definable sets of models, then their intersection
X ∩ Y is also definable.
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Proof: By the remarks above: if X = Â and Y = B̂, X ∩ Y = Â ∩ Ŷ =̂A ∪ B =.
Definition 6 A choice function on M is a function f : 2M→ 2M.
Note that f is defined on arbitrary sets of models, not only on definable sets
as in [7]. In the same vein, we do not require here that the image by f of a
definable set be definable as was necessary in the corresponding soundness
result of [7].
Definition 7 A triplet 〈M, |=, f〉 is an fC-model (for language L) iff |= is
a binary relation on M×L and f is a choice function M that satisfies, for
any sets X, Y :
Contraction f(X) ⊆ X
and
Local Cumulativity f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒ f(Y ) = f(X).
Definition 8 An fC-model is said to be a restricted fC-model iff its choice
function f also satisfies, for any set X:
Consistency f(X) = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅.
2.4 Properties of fC-models
This section makes clear the relation between fC-models and the models
of [7]. It will not be used in the sequel. There one considered choice functions
satisfying Contraction,
Coherence X ⊆ Y ⇒ X ∩ f(Y ) ⊆ f(X)
and
Local Monotonicity f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒ f(Y ) ⊆ f(X).
Lemma 13 Any function f that satisfies Inclusion, Coherence and Local
Monotonicity satisfies Local Cumulativity.
Proof: Assume f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X , we must show that f(X) ⊆ f(Y ) (the
opposite inclusion is guaranteed by Local Monotonicity). By Coherence:
Y ∩ f(X) ⊆ f(Y ).
7
2.5 Soundness
Theorem 1 Let 〈M, |=, f〉 be an fC-model and the operation C be such that:
C(A) = f(Â).(1)
Then C is a C-logics.
Proof: By Contraction f(Â) ⊆ Â and therefore Â ⊆ f(Â). But A ⊆ Â. We
have proved Inclusion.
Assume now A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). We have: Ĉ(A) ⊆ B̂ ⊆ Â. But Ĉ(A) =
̂
f(Â). But f(Â) ⊆
̂
f(Â). We have: f(Â) ⊆ B̂ ⊆ Â. By Local Cumulativity,
then: f(Â) = f(B̂) and C(A) = C(B).
2.6 Representation
Theorem 2 If C is a C-logics, then there is a restricted fC-model 〈M, |=, f〉
such that C(A) = f(Â).
Notice that, comparing to Theorem 1 we are getting Consistency for free.
Proof: For M take all consistent theories of C. Set T |= a iff a ∈ T . It
follows that, by Lemma 7, for any A ⊆ L,
Â = Cn(A).
We must now define a choice function f . We shall do that in two stages.
First, we shall define f on definable sets of models, then on arbitrary sets.
Suppose that X is a definable subset of M and that X = Â = B̂. Then,
Cn(A) = Cn(B) and, by Lemma 10, C(A) = C(B). The following definition
of f , for any definable set of models, is therefore well-formed: f(Â) = Ĉ(A).
It is worth noticing that for any A, f(Â) is a definable set. This is not in fact
required by Theorem 1. More stringent properties of f on definable sets only,
such as Coherence or the requirement that the image by f be a singleton,
may be obtained but at the cost of definability-preservation. We easily see
that: f(Â) = Ĉ(A) = Cn(C(A) = C(A), by Lemma 10. Notice that, in the
above, we use f only on definable sets. We shall now show that f satisfies
Contraction, Local Cumulativity and Consistency, when all sets considered
are definable. We shall leave for the end the definition of a proper extension
8
of f to arbitrary sets of models. Let X = Â be a definable subset of M.
By Inclusion, A ⊆ C(A) = f(Â). Therefore
̂
f(X) ⊆ X . But f(X) ⊆
̂
f(X)
as shown in Section 2.3. We have proved Contraction.
LetX = Â and Y = B̂ be definable subsets of L and assume: f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X .
We have: Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 10 and Cumulativity, we
have: C(Cn(A)) = C(Cn(B)) and, by Lemma 10, C(A) = C(B). Therefore
f(X) = Ĉ(A) = ̂C(B) = f(Y ). We have proved Local Cumulativity.
Let X = Â be a definable subset of L such that f(X) = Ĉ(A) = ∅. We
have Cn(C(A)) = Ĉ(A) = L. By Lemma 10, then, A is inconsistent. By
Lemma 4 there is no consistent theory that includes A and therefore Â = X = ∅.
We have proved Consistency.
We must now extend f to arbitrary subsets of M in a way that enforces
Contraction, Local Cumulativity and Consistency. Given an arbitrary subset
X ⊆M, we shall define f ′(X) by considering two cases.
• First, if there is some definable set Y such that f(Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ Y , then
we shall put f ′(X) = f(Y ).
• Secondly, if there is no such definable Y we shall put f ′(X) = X .
We must first check that the first case above is a proper definition. Suppose
indeed that f(Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ Y and f(Z) ⊆ X ⊆ Z for definable sets Y and Z.
Then, by Lemma 12, the set Y ∩ Z is definable and f(Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ Y ∩ Z ⊆ Y .
Therefore, by Cumulativity of f (all sets considered are definable), f(Y ) = f(Y ∩ Z).
Similarly, f(Z) = f(Y ∩ Z) and f(Y ) = f(Z).
Let us notice now that, if X is definable, then f ′(X) = f(X), since
f(X) ⊆ X ⊆ X by Contraction.
Let us show, now, that f ′(X) ⊆ X . In the first case: f ′(X) = f(Y ) ⊆ X
and in the second case f ′(X) = X.
Suppose now that f ′(Y ) ⊆ X ⊆ Y , for arbitrary sets X and Y . We
shall consider the two different cases of the definition of f ′(Y ). If there
is a definable Z such that f(Z) ⊆ Y ⊆ Z, then we have f ′(Y ) = f(Z) and
f(Z) ⊆ X ⊆ Z. Therefore f ′(X) = f(Z) = f ′(Y ). If there is no such Z, then
f ′(Y ) = Y and X = Y . Therefore f ′(X) = f ′(Y ).
For Consistency, assume f ′(X) = ∅. In the first case, there is a definable Z
such that f(Z) ⊆ X ⊆ Z. Then f(Z) = f ′(X) = ∅ and Z = ∅ and therefore
X = ∅. In the second case f ′(X) = X = ∅.
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2.7 Connectives in C-logics
2.7.1 Conjunction and Negation
We shall show that C-logics admit a classical conjunction and a classical
negation. Let us assume now, for the remainder of this section, that the lan-
guage L is closed under a binary connective written ∧ and a unary connective
written ¬.
Theorem 3 If 〈M, |=, f〉 is a restricted fC-model that behaves classically
with respect to ∧ and ¬, i.e., for any m ∈M,
• m |= a ∧ b iff m |= a and m |= b
• m |= ¬a iff m 6|= a,
then the inference operation defined by the fC-model satisfies:
• ∧-R C(A, a ∧ b) = C(A, a, b)
• ¬-R1 C(A, a,¬a) = L
• ¬-R2 if C(A,¬a) = L, then a ∈ C(A).
Proof: The first property follows from the fact that Mod(A ∪ {a ∧ b}) =
Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {b}). For the second property notice that Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {¬a}) = ∅
implies, by Contraction, that f(Mod(A ∪ {a} ∪ {¬a})) = ∅. For the third
property, since no element of M satisfies both a and ¬a, if C(A,¬a) = L,
there is no m that satisfies C(A,¬a) and f(Mod(A ∪ ¬a)) = ∅. Since the
model is a restricted fC-model, Mod(A ∪ ¬a) = ∅. Therefore every m that
satisfies A also satisfies a and a ∈ C(A).
The reader should notice that it is claimed that, if C(A,¬a) = L, then any m
satisfying A also satisfies a, but it is not claimed that, under this hypothesis,
a ∈ Cn(A). Indeed Cn is defined via the theories of C and the relation of
those to the elements of M is not straightforward. The reader should also
note that a similar result (Equation 8.5) was obtained in [7] only assuming
Coherence. Here Coherence is not required, Consistency is required in its
place. The following theorem shows the converse. It requires a compactness
assumption. We shall, then, assume that C satisfies the following:
Weak Compactness C(A) = L ⇒ ∃ a finite B⊆fA such that C(B) = L.
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Theorem 4 If C satisfies Weak Compactness, Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R,
¬-R1 and ¬-R2, then there is a restricted fC-model that behaves classically
with respect to ∧ and ¬ such that C(A) = f(Â).
Before presenting a proof of Theorem 4, three lemmas are needed. A maximal
consistent subset of L is a consistent subset that has no consistent superset.
Lemma 14 Assume C satisfies Weak Compactness, ¬−R1 and ¬−R2. If
a 6∈ C(A), there is a maximal consistent set B ⊇ A such that a 6∈ B.
Proof: By ¬ − R2, A ∪ {¬a} is consistent. By Weak Compactness (and
Zorn’s lemma), there is a maximal consistent set B that contains it. This B
does not contain a by ¬ − R1.
Lemma 15 Assume C satisfies Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-
R2. If A is a maximal consistent set, then
• a ∧ b ∈ A iff a ∈ A and b ∈ A,
• ¬a ∈ A iff a 6∈ A.
Proof: By ∧-R, a ∧ b ∈ C(A) iff a ∈ C(A) and b ∈ C(A), but, by Lemma 6,
A is a theory. If ¬a ∈ A, then a 6∈ A since A is consistent, by ¬-R1. If
¬a 6∈ A, then by the maximality of A, C(A,¬a = L and, by ¬-R2, a ∈ C(A),
but A is a theory.
Lemma 16 Assume C satisfies Weak Compactness, ¬ − R1 and ¬ − R2.
Then
Cn(A) =
⋂
B⊇A,B maximal consistent
B.
Proof: The left-hand side is a subset of the right-hand side by Lemmas 7
and 16. But if a 6∈ Cn(A), then a 6∈ C(A) and, by Lemma 14, there is a
maximal consistent B that includes C(A) but does not contain a.
Let us now proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.
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Proof: We modify the construction of Theorem 2, by considering not all
consistent theories but only maximal consistent sets. Those maximal consis-
tent sets are theories and behave classically for ∧ and ¬ by Lemma 15. By
Lemma 16, for any A ⊆ L,
Â = Cn(A).
The remainder of the proof is unchanged.
We may now show that propositional nonmonotonic logic is not weaker than
(and therefore exactly the same as) monotonic logic. In the following theo-
rem, we consider a propositional language in which negation and conjunction
are considered basic and other connectives are defined in the usual classical
way.
Theorem 5 Let L be a propositional calculus (negation and conjunction ba-
sic, other connectives defined classically) and a, b ∈ L. The following propo-
sitions are equivalent.
1. a logically implies b, i.e., a |= b,
2. for any operation C that satisfies Inclusion, Idempotence, Monotonicity,
Weak Compactness and the rules ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2 above: b ∈ C(a),
3. for any operation C that satisfies Inclusion, Cumulativity, Weak Com-
pactness and the rules ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2 above: b ∈ C(a),
4. for any such C and for any A ⊆ L: b ∈ C(A, a),
5. for any such C: C(a,¬b) = L.
Proof: Property 5 implies 4, since, by Cumulativity, C(a,¬b) = L implies
C(A, a,¬b) = L, and, by the rule ¬-R2: b ∈ C(A, a). Property 4 obviously
implies 3, that implies 2 since Monotonicity and Idempotence imply Cumula-
tivity. It is easy to see that property 2 implies 1. Let m be any propositional
model that satisfies a. Let C be defined by C(A) = {m}, the set of formulas
satisfied by m, if m ∈ Â and C(A) = L otherwise. By assumption, b ∈ C(a).
But C(a) = {m} since m ∈ {̂a}, therefore m |= b.
The only non-trivial part of the proof is that 1 implies 5. Assume a |= b
and C satisfies Inclusion, Cumulativity, Weak Compactness and the rules
∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. By Theorem 4, there is a set M, a satisfaction rela-
tion |= that behaves classically with respect to ∧ and ¬ and a definability-
preserving choice function satisfying Contraction and Local Cumulativity
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such that C(a,¬b) = f({̂a} ∩ ̂{¬b}). But, by assumption {̂a} ∩ ̂{¬b} = ∅.
By Contraction, then C(a,¬b) = ∅ = L.
Theorem 5 shows that the proof theory of the semantically-classical conjunc-
tion and negation in a nonmonotonic setting is the same as in a monotonic
setting. The following shows, that, in yet another sense, C-logics admit a
proper conjunction and a proper negation: one may conservatively extend
any C-logics on a set of atomic propositions to a language closed under con-
junction and negation. It is customary to consider Introduction-Elimination
rules, such as ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2 as definitions of the connectives. Hack-
ing [5, Section VII] discusses this idea and proposes that, to be considered as
bona fide definitions of the connectives, the rules must be such that they en-
sure that any legal logic on a small language may be conservatively extended
to a legal logic on the language extended by closure under the connective.
Theorem 6 Let P be an arbitrary set of atomic propositions and C a C-
logics over P . Let L be the closure of P under ∧ and ¬. Then, there exists
a C-logics C’ on L that satisfies ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2, such that, for any
A ⊆ P , C(A) = P ∩ C′(A).
Proof: By Theorem 2, there is a restricted fC-model on P 〈M, |=, f〉 such
that C(A) = f(Â). Let us now extend |= to L by m |= a ∧ b iff m |= a and
m |= b and m |= ¬a iff m 6|= a. We claim that 〈M, |=, f〉 is now a restricted
fC-model on L, whose satisfaction relation |= behaves classically for ¬ and
∧. Indeed, the properties required from f do not involve the satisfaction
relation at all, they deal with subsets of M exclusively. Let us define, for
any A ⊆ L, C′(A) = f(Â). By Theorem 1, C’ is a C-logics. By Theorem 3 it
satisfies ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. It is left to us to see that C(A) = P ∩ C′(A),
for any A ⊆ P . This follows straightforwardly from the fact that both C(A)
and C′(A) are the sets of formulas (the former of P , the latter of L) satisfied
by all members of the set f(Â).
2.7.2 Disjunction
We have seen that any C-logics admits classical negation and conjunction.
The reader may think that this implies that it also admits a classical disjunc-
tion defined as a ∨ b = ¬(¬a ∧ ¬b). Indeed it is the case that, if we define
disjunction in this way one of the basic properties of disjunction is satisfied:
∨ −R1 a ∈ C(A) ⇒ a ∨ b ∈ C(A) and b ∨ a ∈ C(A).
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But the other fundamental property of disjunction does not hold.
∨ −R2 C(A, a) ∩ C(A, b) ⊆ C(A, a ∨ b).
The following example shows that, in general, no proper disjunction can be
defined in C-logics.
Example 1 Consider the language L that contains four (atomic) proposi-
tions a, b, c, d. Let M contain three elements: m,n, p. Let models be defined
by: m |= a, m |= c, n |= a, n |= d, p |= b and p |= c. The set {m,n} is defin-
able (by a) and so is the set {m} (by {a, c}). The function f is the identity
on all definable sets, except that f({m,n}) = {m}. The choice function pre-
serves definability and satisfies Contraction and Local Cumulativity. Indeed
if f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X and Y 6= X, we must have X = {m,n} and Y = {m}. But
in this case f(Y ) = Y = f(X). We have c ∈ C(a) and also c ∈ C(b). If there
was a proper disjunction we should have also c ∈ C(a ∨ b), and m |= a ∨ b,
n |= a ∨ b p |= a ∨ b. Therefore â ∨ b = {m,n, p} and ninf({m,n, p}. But
n 6|= c.
This example above has to be opposed to the results of [7] that show that if
f satisfies Coherence, there is a satisfactory disjunction.
2.8 Connection with previous work
Theorem 7 Let L be a propositional calculus and C an operation that sat-
isfies Weak-Compactness, Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2.
Define a binary relation among propositions by: a ∼b iff b ∈ C(a). Then, the
relation ∼ is a cumulative relation in the sense of [6].
Proof: We shall show that ∼ satisfies Left Logical Equivalence, Right
Weakening, Reflexivity, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. For Left-Logical-
Equivalence, suppose |= a↔ a′. By Theorem 5, a′ ∈ C(a) and, by Cumulativ-
ity, C(a) = C(a, a′). But, similarly, exchanging a and a′: C(a′) = C(a, a′) and
C(a) = C(a′). For Right Weakening, by Theorem 5 b |= b′ implies b′ ∈ C(a, b).
If a ∼ b, by Cumulativity C(a) = C(a, b) and a ∼ b′. Reflexivity follows from
Inclusion. Cut and Cautious Monotonicity together are equivalent to: if
a ∼ b, then a ∧ b ∼ c iff a ∼ c. Assume b ∈ C(a), then, by Cumulativity,
C(a) = C(a, b).
The converse also holds.
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Theorem 8 If ∼ is a cumulative relation, then there is an operation C that
satisfies Weak-Compactness, Inclusion, Cumulativity, ∧-R, ¬-R1 and ¬-R2
such that b ∈ C(a) iff a ∼ b.
Proof: The operation C may be defined in a way first proposed in the
Theorem 14 of [4]: b ∈ C(A) iff there exists some formula a such that A |= a
(|= is logical implication of propositional calculus) enjoying the following
property: for any a′ such that A |= a′ and a′ |= a, one has a′ ∼b. For Weak
Compactness, assume C(A) = L. Then false ∈ C(A) and there is some a
such that A |= a and a ∼ false. There is a finite subset B of A such that
B |= a. Let b be the conjunction of all the propositions of B. We have b |= a
and therefore b ∼ a. But a ∼ false implies a ∼ b. Therefore b ∼ false and
C(B) = C(b) = L. The other properties claimed are not difficult to show.
3 L-logics
A sub-family of C-logics will be defined now. It corresponds to the cumulative
with loop (CL) relations of [6].
Definition 9 The operation C is said to be an L-logics iff it satisfies the two
following properties.
Inclusion ∀A ⊆ L , A ⊆ C(A),
Loop ∀n∀i = 0, . . . , n− 1 modulo nAi ⊆ C(Ai+1)⇒ C(A0) = C(A1).
The assumption of Loop is: A0 ⊆ C(A1), A1 ⊆ C(A2), . . . , An−1 ⊆ C(A0).
The conclusion could equivalently have been: C(Ai) = C(Aj) for any i, j =
0, . . . , n− 1. Notice that for n = 2, the condition Loop is the condition 2-
Loop of Lemma 2. Therefore any L-logics is a C-logics. The characteristic
property of L-logics is embedded in the relation to be defined now.
Definition 10 Let T and S be theories. Let us define T ≤ S iff there exists
a set A ⊆ S such that C(A) = T .
The following holds without any assumption on C.
Lemma 17 The relation ≤ is reflexive. If T, S are two theories such that
T ⊆ S, then T ≤ S.
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Proof: S ⊆ S and C(S) = S imply S ≤ S. T ⊆ S and C(T ) = T imply
T ≤ S.
The next lemma holds only for L-logics. Notice that, even for L-logics, the
relation ≤ is not transitive in general.
Lemma 18 If C is an L-logics, and T0 ≤ T1, . . ., Tn−1 ≤ T0, then T0 = T1 =
. . . = Tn−1.
Proof: Assume T0 ≤ T1, . . ., Tn−1 ≤ T0. There are Ai ⊆ Ti+1 such that
C(Ai) = Ti. Therefore Ai−1 ⊆ C(Ai) and by Loop C(Ai) = C(Aj).
In particular, the relation ≤ is antisymmetric for L-logics (in fact for C-
logics).
Definition 11 Let T and S be theories. Let us define T < S iff T ≤ S
and S 6≤ T , or equivalently (for C-logics) T ≤ S and T 6= S. Let <+ be the
transitive closure of <.
Lemma 19 If C is an L-logics, then the relation <+ is irreflexive and there-
fore a strict partial order.
Proof: By Lemma 18.
4 Quantum Consequence Operations
Birkhoff and von Neumann [1] framed Quantum Logics in Hilbert style, i.e.,
as a set of valid propositions in propositional calculus. Engesser and Gab-
bay [3] proposed to view Quantum Logics in a different light: as a conse-
quence relation describing what can be deduced from what. They assume
a language closed under the propositional connectives, but their definition
makes perfect sense and is very rich even on a language that contains only
atomic propositions. This is, in this paper’s view, a major step taken by En-
gesser and Gabbay since Birkhoff and von Neumann’s framework does not
allow any interesting consideration in the absence of connectives. The set-
ting proposed by Engesser and Gabbay allows us to discuss first the nature
of Quantum Deduction without any need to posit connectives, and then to
consider the proof-theoretic and semantics properties of connectives one at a
time.
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Assume a Hilbert space H and an element h ∈ H are given. Assume
also a non-empty set (language) L of closed subspaces of H is given. The
elements of L, the atomic propositions are, thus, closed subspaces of H. For
every proposition a ∈ L, we shall denote by ap the projection on the subspace
a: for every x ∈ H, ap(x) is the element of a closest to x. For every set of
propositions: A ⊆ L, A∗
def
=
⋂
a∈A a and A
∗
p will denote the projection on A
∗,
i.e., on the intersection of all the elements of A.
Definition 12 (Engesser-Gabbay) Let C : 2L −→ 2L be defined by:
b ∈ C(A) iff A∗p(h) ∈ b.(2)
Theorem 9 The operation C defined above is an L-logics.
Engesser and Gabbay essentially noticed already that C is a C-logics. We
need a lemma.
Lemma 20 If B ⊆ C(A), then A∗p(h) = (A
∗ ∩B∗)p(h) and d(h,A
∗) ≥ d(h,B∗).
Proof: For any b ∈ B, A∗p(h) ∈ b. Therefore A
∗
p(h) ∈ B
∗.
Let us now prove Theorem 9
Proof: Indeed, A∗ph ∈ A
∗ and therefore, for any a ∈ A, Aph ∈ a, and we
have shown Inclusion.
Assume A ⊆ B ⊆ C(A). By Lemma 20, we have A∗p(h) = (A
∗ ∩B∗)p(h),
but B∗ ⊆ A∗ and A∗p(h) = B
∗
p(h). Therefore C(A) = C(B) and we have shown
Cumulativity.
A1 ⊆ C(A0), A2 ⊆ C(A1), . . . , A0 ⊆ C(An)⇒ C(A0) = C(A1)
For Loop, assume Ai ⊆ C(Ai+1), for i = 0, . . . , n− 1 (mod n). By Lemma 20,
d(h,Ai+1) ≥ d(h,Ai) and therefore all those distances are equal: d(h,A0) = d(h,A1),
A0
∗
p(h) = A1
∗
p(h) and C(A0) = C(A1).
5 Open Question
Do the four properties above characterize those consequence operations pre-
sentable by Hilbert spaces? Or are there other properties shared by those
operations presentable by Hilbert spaces that do not follow from the above?
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6 Connectives
6.1 Conjunction
Conjunction is unproblematic. Even infinite conjunctions are easily defined.
If A is a set of propositions, and each a ∈ A is associated with some closed
subspace a∗, we may associate the proposition
∧
a∈A a with the closed sub-
space
⋂
a∈A a
∗, i.e., A∗ and the rule ∧-R is validated: C(A,B) = C(
∧
a, B).
6.2 Negation
The situation for negation is most intriguing. By Theorem 9 any operation C
presented as a Quantum Logic is an L-logics, therefore a C-logics. Theorem 6
shows that C-logics admit a negation satisfying ¬-R1 and ¬-R2. We therefore
expect Quantum Logics to admit such a negation. But the treatment of
negation proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann and later used by Engesser
and Gabbay does not do the job in the following sense. Suppose we define
(¬a)∗ = (a∗)⊥ where ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement. It is easy to see
that ¬-R1 is satisfied since the intersection of a subspace and its orthogonal
complement is {0}, but ¬-R2 is not satisfied. Consider for example three
generic (not parallel and not orthogonal) one-dimensional subspaces (lines
through the origin) a, b and c in the real plane. Let h be any non-zero vector
of c. The intersection of a and b⊥ is {0} and therefore C(a,¬b) = L. But
b 6∈ C(a) since the projection of h on a is not in b. This failure of ¬-R2,
which is the principle of proof by contradiction, was in fact already noted or
guessed by Birkhoff and von Neumann. In section 17, p. 837, they compare
Quantum Logics with other non-classical logics introduced on introspective
or philosophical grounds, such as intuistionistic logics. They note that even
though “logicians have usually assumed that properties of negation were
the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of (quantum)
mechanics points to the distributive identities as the weakest link in the
algebra of logic.” And they conclude: “our conclusion agrees perhaps more
with those critiques of logic, which find most objectionable the assumption
that to deduce an absurdity from the conjunction of a and not b, justifies one
in inferring that a implies b”. This paper’s conclusions agree only in part,
and will be presented below.
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6.2.1 Disjunction
A proper disjunction should satisfy ∨-R1 and ∨−R2 defined in Section 2.7.2.
We have seen that C-logics do not always support such a disjunction. It is
left to be seen whether Quantum Logics support such a disjunction. In any
C-logics that satisfies ∧-R, ∨-R1 and ∨-R2, the distributive equality holds, in
the sense that C(A, a ∧ (b ∨ c)) = C(A, (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)). The only Quantum
Logics that admit a proper disjunction are therefore those Quantum Logics
that support the distributive law. This is a very limited family.
7 Conclusions and future work
Quantum Logics are nonmonotonic logics as noticed by Engesser and Gabbay,
they are also very respectable nonmonotonic logics since they are L-logics.
It is indeed surprising that Quantum Logics come to satisfy formal prop-
erties designed with a completely different intention: to describe properties
“introduced on introspective grounds” and intended to describe disciplined
“jumping to conclusions”. Intersection of closed subspaces provides a perfect
semantics for conjunction. Orthogonal complement does not provide a suit-
able semantics for negation, but there is probably a respectable negation. It
seems doubtful that one could find a suitable corresponding operation among
closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces that would enable us to associate a closed
subspace to the negation of a closed subspace. This probably means that
one cannot assume that the negation of an observable is an observable. But
must we insist that the negation of an observable be observable? Couldn’t
negation mean something about what we know and not about the world?
Disjunction is probably incompatible with Quantum Logics altogether.
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